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By letter of 10 September 1973 the President of the European Parliament 
forwarded the Second Report from the Commission of the European Communities 
on Competition Policy (annexed to the 'Sixth General Report on the Activities 
of the communities') to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs as 
the committee responsible and to the Committee on Energy, Research and 
Technology, the Committee on Regional Policy and Transport and the Committee 
on Social Affairs and Employment for their opinions. 
At the request of the Committee on Regional Policy and Transport on 
9 October, the committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs was also designated 
as the committee responsible for considering the Communication from the 
commission of the European Communities on the implementation of the 
principles of coordination of regional aid in 1972. The Committee on 
Regional Policy and Transport and the Committee on Budgets were asked for 
their opinions. 
On 13 July 1973 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs appointed 
Mr Artzinger rapporteur. 
It considered the draft report at its meetings of 13 July, 14 September, 
12 October, 5 November and 29 November, 1973. At the meeting of 
29 November it approved the motion for a resolution unanimously. 
The following were present: 
Mr Lange, chairman: Mr Notenboom, vice-chairman: Mr Artzinger, 
rapporteur: Mr Burgbacher, Mr Fl~g (deputizing for Mr Arndt), Mr Harrnegnies, 
Mr Leenhardt, Mr Mitterdorfer, Mr Normanton, Mr Scholten and Mr Yeats. 
The opinions of the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology, 
the committe9 on Regional Policy and Transport, and the Committee on Social 
Affairs and Employment are attached to this report. 
The opinion of the Committee on Budgets will be distributed later. 
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The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs hereby submits to the 
European Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with 
explanatory statements 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the Second Report from the Commission of the Guropean Communities 011 
Competition Policy and on the Communication from the Commission or the 
European Communities on the implementation of the principles of coordination 
of regional aid in 1972 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to the Second Report from the Commission of the European 
Communities on Competition Policy (Doc. 148/73), and the Communication 
from the Commission of the European Communities on the implementution of 
the principles of coordination of regional aid in 1972 (Doc. 122/73), 
having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Energy, Research and 
Technolog~, the committee on Regional Policy and Transport and the 
committee on Social Affairs and Employment (Doc. 264/73), 
1. Recognizes that in its Second Report on Competition Policy the commission 
has met a number of wishes expressed by the European Parliament1 
2. Supports the Commission's efforts to acquire powers in respect of 
industrial concentrations comparable with its powers on restrictive 
agreements, 
3. Urges the Commission to submit proposals in the near future defining 
more clearly the scope of the Community's competition rules and those 
of the Member States respectively, pursuant to Article 87 (2) of the 
EEC Treaty7 
4. Requests the Commission to consider the possibility of harmonizing 
national provisions on unfair competition; 
5. considers it desirable to establish a European Office for competition 
Policy, which would receive political guidance from the Commission, but 
which would otherwise act independently in carrying out investigations 
and taking decisions, 
6. Draws attention to the fact that recent rulings of the Court of Justice 
of the European communities make it all the more essential for the 
Commission to decide promptly on notified agreements, clarify as 
soon as possible its policy on licensing and know-how agreements and 
turn its attention to restrictive practices in the research sectorr 
PE 34. 607 /fin 
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7. Expects the Commission to remain vigilant in the future in combating 
agreements designed to prevent the re-exporting of products, 
e. considers that decisions on investments are primarily business 
risks and should remain so, but that it may be useflll for the Commission 
to arrange market analyses and compile supply and demand forecasts for 
specific sectors: 
9. Awaits the early replacement of existing regional aid regulations l.Jy a 
regulation under which the scale of aid would be geared to the economic· 
and social backwardness of a given region: 
10. Finds that the chapter on public undertakings contains no guidelines, 
and reiterates its request to the Commission to draw up.directives 
and decisions designed to remove distortion of competition between 
public and private undertakings, 
11, Reaffirms1 the need to amplify the Community's rules on competition by 
an international agreement on regulations governing competition to ensure 
that multinational undertakings operate under uniform conditions of 
competition; 
12, Urges the Commission to consult the recently created consultative 
committee on C~nsumer Protection at an early stage when drawing up 
proposals directly affecting consumer interests; 
13. Urges the Commission to collaborate in the wide dissemination of the 
results of comparative product tests and to promote joint studies by 
consumer associations in the individual Member States: 
14. Requests the Commission to study the possibility of drawing up a community 
regulation on misleading advertising and aggressive selling methods: 
15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the report of its 
committee to the Council and Commission of the European Communities. 
1 OJ No, c 14, 27 March 1973, p. 9 
- 6 - PE 34.607/fin 
B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
I. Competition_policy_in_!~Z~ 
In recent years Community competition policy has become a reality 
which the economy has to take into account. The Commission is now making 
full use of the substantial powers conferred upon it in this field by the 
Treaty. Basically the European Parliament agrees with the Commission's 
method of doing so. This also applies to the Commission's efforts 
to achieve a balance between its powers on restrictive agreements and its 
inadequate powers where mergers are concerned. 
The enlargement of the Community must also be considered an advantage 
from the point of view of competition policy. Economic power can best be 
held in check by effective competition. In present circumstances this 
presupposes a large market, with room for a suitable number of large under-
takings. This is another reason for welcoming the three new Member States. 
Although the Commission has made great progress, it has not yet 
advanced to the point where it could confine itself merely to implementing 
a readymade policy. Anti-concentration policy, and the policy relating to 
particular forms of restrictive agreement (patent and licence contracts, 
know-how contracts, buying and selling contracts) have not yet been clearly 
worked out. 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs urges the Commission to 
submit proposals immediately, defining for instance the scope of the Communi1:¥'s 
competition rules and those of the Member States respectively, pursuant to 
Article 87(2), sub-paragraph (e). The Commission should also consider the 
possibility of harmonizing Member States' regulations on unfair cor, ,)etition, 
since a competition policy is not only designed to maintain and revive 
competition but also to protect those involved in the economic process 
against unfair competition. In the Community, the legal provisions vary 
enormously, and efforts must be made to achieve a measure of uniformity in 
this field. 
In view of the greater responsibilities of the Commission and the 
increasing importance of competition policy in the Community, consideration 
must be given to the creation of a European Office for Competition Policy, 
which would receive political directives from the Commission, but in 
practice would be largely independent in its work and decision-making. 
The manner in which the commission has published this year's report on 
competition policy complies with several requests made by the European 
Parliament. For example, this year it has devoted a long chapter to 
public undertakings; it has also given attention to other forms of 
government contribution to the capital of certain undertakings (IMI and 
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GEPI in Italy, IDI in France). The second Report also contains a chapter 
on competition policy in which the implementation of the competition rules 
in individual sectors is discussed. The section on banking is of part-
icular interest here. Finally the Community's competition policy has been 
tied in more closely with other policies, wherever areas of convergence 
exist, and this also was requested by Parliament. 
The following sections will cover only some areas of competition 
policy. It seemed opportune, this year in particular, to discuss the 
Commission's proposal on merger control in greater detail. 
II. Restrictive_agreements 
1 
2 
Restrictive agreements still represent a form of restraint on 
competition which it is very difficult to control. The harder the cartel 
offices crack down the stronger is the tendency to resort to what the 
Commission euphemistically calls 'discreet forms of concerted behaviou.r 
on the market' . 1 
Nevertheless,. further action must be taken against restrictive 
agreements when their existence is discovered by the Commission. Shortly 
after the period covered by the report - in February 1973 - the Court of 
Justice in its judgment on Haecht II took a number of major decisions 
which gave a new slant to the Commission's rules on restrictive agreements. 
This judgment makes a sharp distinction between 'old' and 'new' agreements2. 
In the case of old agreements, the national court cannot declare them 
invalid until the Commission has announced its decision. In the imple~-
entation· of new agreements however, the risk will be borne in future by 
the parties to them. If a complaint is made against a restrictive agree-
ment being declared void in a national court pursuant to Article 85(2) of 
the Treaty, three courses of action are open to the court: 
- it can suspend proceedings and give the parties the opportunity of 
obtaining the Commission's opinion. 
- it can decide that the agreement is not prohibited under the terms of 
Article 85(1). 
- it can decide that the agreement contravenes the article. on restrictive 
agreememts. 
Second Report on 0:,mpetition Policy, p. 28 
For the original Member States old agreements are those concluded before 
13.3.1962, the date Procedural Regulation No. 17/62 entered into force. In 
the three new Member States restrictive agreements concluded before 1.1.1973 
and notified not later than 1.7.1973 pursuant to the Treaty of Accession are 
considered to be old agreements. 
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This applies to agreements subject to notification as well as 
restrictive agreements where notification is not required. It is 
important to note that nullity is retroactive. 1 
The Haecht II-Judgment was a sign that the Community was tightening 
up its competition policy. Undertakings will now definitely have 
to consider whether their agreement complies with the competition rules. 
This will give rise to a certain amount of legal confusion for some 
undertakings, although this is only a slight drawback, since the 
Commission's policy has been so clearly defined over the years that firms 
should no longer have any doubts. Indeed, the very fact that policy has 
been more clearly spelt out enabled the Court of Justice to give a new 
interpretation to the rules on restrictive agreements. The judgment 
should be an incentive to the Commission to clarify certain aspects of 
its policy as soon as possible; it should also result in prompt decisions 
being given on notified agreements. 
Aspects of the policy which need to be further clarified are licen-
sing and know-how agreements, restrictive agreements in the field of 
research, as well as buying and selling agreements. The dissemination of 
useful knowledge is frequently dependent on an exclusive licence being 
granted; clearly this must not be linked to a ban on re-export. The 
licensing agreements often contain provisions which, while restricting 
competition, are not essential to the protection of industrial property. 
'!'he commission intends to grant general exemption for specific know-how 
and licensing agreements. 
1 This judgment departs considerably from the principles established by 
the court of Justice in its previous jurisdiction. In the 'Bosch 
judgment' of 1962 the court concluded that agreements should be 
regarded as valid when notification is optional, and as provisionally 
valid when they have been notified pursuant to Procedure at Regulation 
No. 17/62. The judgment did not establish, however,.whether provisional 
validity made the agreement legally binding. The Court of Justice did 
not confirm this point until 1969•. in the 'Portelange judgment' it was 
stated that notified agreements are fully effective provided that the 
Commission has not yet announced its decision. In the Bilger judgment 
the court went even further. This stated that an agreement that is not 
notifiable and has not in fact been notified is fully effective as long 
as its nullity has not been established. Should it later be declared 
void, this takes effect only from the date of the judgment, as the 
Court of Justice established in the Bilger judgment. 
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The Second Report on competition policy contains no information on 
buying and selling agreements nor on joint research and its benefits. 
The committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs still considers that a 
restrictive policy should be followed in this area. If the results of 
joint research are exploited by large undertakings in conjunction, there 
is a considerable risk of serious restraint on competition. 
The Commission asks that the so-called 'self-limitation agreements', 
(section 17) should be notified in every case and rightly adds that 
agreements on import curtailment in another country are part of commercial 
policy and should therefore remain in the hands of the public authorities. 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs endorses this view 
absolutely. There are in fact three distinct types of self-limitation 
agreement: agreements forming part of a trade agreement, self-limitation 
undertaken unilaterally by the exporting country, and finally agreements 
concluded by undertakings or an industrial sector in the exporting country 
alone or with undertakings in the importing country. competition policy 
is concerned only with the last of these three. The commission is about 
to consider a number of cases in this category. 
From time to time it is pointed out, particularly by Parliament, 
that th~ price of one particular product varies considerably from country 
to conntry. These price differences are particularly noticeable in the 
r..otor vehicle trade. The commission has enquired into the matter, and 
has managed to persuade some car manufacturers to harmonize their dealership 
arrangements. However, the position is still far from satisfactory. 1 
It is not really a question of denying a manufacturer the right to 
fix different prices for his product in different countries. But it is 
wrong for retailers to be prohibited from re-exporting, as is not 
infrequently the case. Without this ban the price differences would not 
be as marked as they have been in some cases. The commission will have 
to take decisive action to combat such practices in the future. 
III. Agreements_concerning_investments 
The report on the resolution on the First Report of the European 
Communities on policy with regard to competition (PE 31.092/fin.) 
discusses at length the possibility of coordinating investment in 
certain sectors2 , and in particular those sectors in which developing 
production techniques are enouraging the creation of extremely large 
units of production. In the Second Report on Competition Policy (section 
18) the Commission admits that this is a serious problem, although it 
1 OJ No. c 39/73, p.13 ' 
2 The European Parliament had already drawn attention to this problem 
in its resolution of 7 June 1971. 
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does not take a definite standpoint on th<!I q11estion" There is howevet· 
a need (whicl1 will probably be e'l.·en greater in the fut11re) for a 
regulation giving the undertakings in the sectors concerned an ideu of 
expected short-term, and in particular long-term supply and demand 
trends. This is not to suggest that the commission should cocrdinate 
:investment by the undertakings. Decisions on investments are pre·· 
eminently an entrepreneurial risk and should remain so. It would 
however be useful to have market analyses and supply and demand fore-
casts for specific sectors drawn up under the responsibility of the 
Commission. On this basis the Commission should be able to recommend an 
investment standstill if necessary, as a result of which government 
investment aids would be suspended in the sectors concerned. The Commit-
tee on Economic and Monetary Affairs calls upon the Conunission to state 
what stage it has reached in its discussions with representatives of the 
undertakings concerned. 
IV. Re9ional_aids 
The highly complex problems of aid coordinationlhave not been made 
any easier by Britain's accession to the community. On the contrary, 
Gre~t Britain has a long tradition of varied and radical measures for 
re:;ucing the differences between richer and poorer areas. Almost half 
(49%) of the active population in Britain works in are;:.s qualif1ri.ng for 
regional aid. 
In 1971 the Six agreed on the first comprehensive measures to 
coordinate regional aids. As a result, since 1 January 1972, in the 
so-called central areas (i.e. the whole communit~l exc0pt for Berlin, the 
~rea of the German Federal - Republic on the East German border, the 
Mezzogiorno and parts of west and south-west France) regional aids 
should in no circumstances exceed 20% of capital investment. It was 
stated in the Treaty of Accession that this coordina~ion Legulation should 
~lso be applied to the new Member States with effect from 1 July 1973 at 
the latest, by Commission decision. This has now been formally enacted, 
but the effect of the commission's decision has been to postpone this 
·until the end of 1974 at the latest. The Commission stipulated that. the 
areas of Great Britain which receive no aid, and the so··called 'inter-
mediate areas' would be regarded provisionally as centra1°areaa. As for 
Scotland, the north of England, Wales and south-west England, the Commission 
did not yet wish to classify them as either central or peripheral areas. 
These areas are to some extent in competition with areas in other Member 
States that do not benefit from regional aid. Community coordination will 
thus be of considerable importance. 
1 communication from the commission of the Europea:,. Communities on the 
implementation of the principles of coordination of reyional aid in 
1972 (Doc. 122/73), 
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There is· A time limit on the present requlation since 
coordination regulations for regional aid in all areas of the enlarged 
community must be introduced by 31 December 1974. The commission would 
be well advised not to wait until this date, as the negotiations on setting 
up a common regional fund are likely to be difficult if a satisfactory 
solution is not found to the classification of areas in Member States. 
The division of the whole community into central and peripheral areas, 
made in October 1971, should soon be replaced by a re~ulation under which 
the scale of aid would be geared to the economic and social backwardness 
of the region concerned, as Parliament proposed in its resolution of 
12 February 1973. 1 
v. Public_undertakings 
The statistics on public undertakings given by the Commission in its 
Second Report on Competition Policy (section 127 ff.) show that these 
undertakings are still of great importance despite their diminishing 
contribution to the gross national product. Relations between public 
undertakings and the state are a serious problem for the Commission. 
There is difficulty even in defining the term 'public undertaking' 
(section 130 of the Second Report on Competition Policy). In a country 
like Italy in particular, it is almost impossible to obtain a clear 
pictur~ of the highly complex telations between the state and the under-
takings in which it has a major interest. It is encouraging that in 
France some progress has been made in applying the principles of 
business management to public undertakings. In Italy, on the other hand, 
the situation has become even more confused, since public undertakings are 
being used increasingly as an instrument of regional and social policy. 
The President of the Central Bank of Italy, Mr Carli, recently described 
in very pessimistic terms2the effects of extending the operational scope 
of public undertakings in Italy, mainly through measures to support under-
takings which had fallen into difficulties. These measures were not part 
of a systematic economic policy, but were of a fairly arbitrary nature and 
their effect would be to gradually isolate the Italian economy from 
European integration. This warning from the President of the Italian 
Central Bank should be taken seriously. 
In the chapter 'Public Undertakings' the Commission aHsembles a 
number of facts which are of great interest as a first analysis of the 
problem. However, the Commission has drawn scarcely any political 
conclusions in its report. 
l OJ No. C 14/73 
2 Relazione del Governatore della Banca d'Italia sull'eserQizio 1972 
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VI. Multinational_undertakin2s 
The Berkhouwer report on the First Report of the European communities 
on policy with regard to cornpetition1 contains an analysis of the special 
features of multinational undertakings as they affect competition policy. 
In sections 52 and 53 of this report, certain conclusions are drawn from 
this analysis, some of which are incorporated in the European Parliama1t's 
resolution of 12 February 1973. 
There is no reason to amend these conclusions. In a recent memorandum 
to the Council, the Danish Government drew attention to the problems raised 
by the rapid development of multinationals and put forward a number of 
requests which are broadly in line with those made by the European 
Parliament and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. The matter 
is currently being discussed in the OECD and the United Nations~ 
. VII.Consumer_Polici 
The part of the Second Report on Competition Policy dealing with 
consumer protection contains little that is new. The Committee on Social 
Affairs and Employment likewise regrets that consumer problems receive so 
little attention in the report3 It will be necessary to await the 
consumer policy programme which, according to a recent answer to a 
written question4 , the Commission proposes to submit by the end of the year. 
Competition policy is ultimately consumer policy. As such, it has 
an important function, especially now that it is often the manufacturer 
and no longer the customer who has the biggest say. The freedom of choice 
still left to the consumer is in many cases, moreover, being eroded by 
restriction of competition and biased market information5 • 
Inadequate consumer information encourages the formation of oligopolies, 
by giving large undertakings the opportunity to exploit advertising in 
selling their products to an ill-informed public. 
The declaration following the Paris Summit Conference of October 1972 
called strongly for action to protect consumers. So far it has brought 
few practical results, apart from the recent formation by the Commission 
of a consultative committee consisting of 25 members, due to hold its first 
meeting shortly. 
l PE 31.092/fin. 
2 IMP. survey, 11 June 1973 
3
. Opinion of the committee on Social Affairs and Employment, PE 34.300/fin. 
4 OJ No. C 68/73 
5 'Bericht des Bundeskartellamtes Uber seine T~tigkeit im Jahre 1972 sowie 
Uber Lage und Entwicklung au£ seinem Aufgabengebiet', p.ll 
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There are two aspects to consumer policy: promotion of market 
transparency for the consumer and the creation of conditions under 
which consumer organizations can help to influence policy in various 
areas. 
In connection with the first point, the Committee on Economic 
and Monetary Affairs notes with interest that consumer organizations 
from various Member States are already collaborating on comparative 
product tests. 
Television programmes dealing with product tests are also of 
considerable importance in working towards greater market trans-
parency. Such programmes should therefore be put out more frequently, 
preferably at peak viewing times. Efforts should be made to provide 
at least as much viewing time for such bradcasts as for advertising. 
consumer organizations are already doing useful work in a preventive 
sense, since manufacturers appear increasingly willing to take their 
recommendations into account even at the product-development stage. 
These organizations therefore help in establishing standards, and 
this obviously places certain responsibilities on them. 
Furthermore, the consumer organizations must set out to influence 
policies and laws directly affecting consumer interests. The Committee 
on Economic and Monetary Affairs endorses a proposal from the 
consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe for an independent 
organization to be set up in each country to advise governments and 
parliaments on legislation and policy. Both consumers and industry 
should be properly represented in these organizations. Great impor-
tance is attached to independence from the authorities, since in many 
markets a substantial proportion of the supply is in the hands of 
the government, which has to look after other interests in addition 
to those of the consumer. Government independence does not necessarily 
imply total financial autonomyi indeed, consumer organizations could 
not do their job properly without public funds. 
Finally, the Commission should investigate the possibility of 
drawing up a Community regulation to combat misleading advertising 
and aggressive selling methods. 
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OPINION OF THE COMMI'I"l'EE ON ENERGY. RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 
Letter from the chairman, Mr SPRINGORUM, to the chairman of the 
committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Mr LANGE 
Dear Mr Lange, 
By letter of 10 September 1973 the President asked this committee for 
its opinion on the Second Report on competition Policy (Doc. 148/73). 
As you will recall, this committee submitted an opinion drafted by 
Mr VANDEWIELE to your committee on the First Report on Competition Policy 
(PE 30.993/fin.), asking the commission to deal in more detail with 
competition in the energy sector in future reports. 
On examining the Second Report on Competition, the Committee on 
Energy, Research and Technology found that this request has been met. It 
therefore has nothing to add to its opinion on the First Report on 
Competition, which was intended to be final. It would be grateful, however, 
if your committee could mention in its report that the request expressed 
last year has been met. 
The Committee on Energy, Research and Technology will also refer in 
its own reports to the situation described in the Second Report on Competition, 
whenever it has immediate cause to do so. 
Yours faithfully, 
(sgd.) G. SPRINGORUM 
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Opinion of the Committee on Regional Policy and Transport 
Craftsman: Mr K. Mitterdorfer 
The Committee on Regional Policy and Transport appointed 
Mr MITTERDORFER draftsman of an opinion on the communication from the 
Commission of the European Communities on the implementation of the 
principles of coordination of regional aid (Doc. 122/73) on 12 September 1973 
and on the second report from the Commission of the European Communities 
on competition policy (Doc. 148/73) on 26 September 1973. 
At its meeting of 4 December 1973 the committee discussed and 
adopted the draft opinion ·unamiously. 
Present at the meeting: Mr James Hill, chairman; Mr Mitterdorfer, draftsman; 
Mr Eisma, Mr van der Gun, Mr Herbert, Mr Johnston, Mr Mursch, Mr Pounder, 
Mr Schwabe, Mr Starke. 
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1. Under the Treaties establishing the European Communities it is the 
Community in~titutions' task to ensure that competition is not distorted in 
the common Market. 
Competition is considered to be the best incentive to economic activity. 
An active competition policy should facilitate the continuous adaptation of 
supply and demand structures to the development of technologies: its 
objective is to ensure the best possible use of production factors. 
2. In its resolution on 'the rules of competition and the position of 
European undertakings in the Common Market and world economy' of 17 June 1971, 
the European Parliament requested the Commission to report annually on the 
development of competition policy. 
To meet this request, the Commission has drawn up since 1972 an annual 
general report on events in competition policy. The advantage of this report 
is that it makes it possible to follow the development of the rules of 
competition as their content becomes clear and accurately defined, competition 
policy being subject to a process of evolution in the same way as the areas 
to which it applies. 
The Commission's report contains all the decisions it has taken on 
agreements (Article 85 of the EEC Treaty and Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty), 
concentrations (Article 86 of the EEC Treaty and Article 66 of the ECSC 
Treaty) and state aid (Article 92 of the EEC Treaty and Article 67 of the 
ECSC Treaty). 
3. Competition policy is not restricted to compelling undertakings to 
observe certain rules of competition: it should also ensure that Community 
interests are the dominant factor in the field of state aid. 
The Member States are making increasing use of aid as an instrument of 
economic policy. 
Even though the free play of market forces is conducive to progress and 
the best means of ensuring optimal allocation of production factors, there 
are situations in which it alone does not allow certain development objec-
tives to be achieved within a reasonable period and without excessive social 
tension. 
Where government action is taken, the aim is therefore to reintegrate 
certain sectors or regions into a practicable and efficient competitive 
system by reducing the social costs of the necessary charges. Thus regional 
policy supports competition policy by allowing the emergence, in certain 
regions, of conditions of competition likely to result in harmonious develop-
ment of the Community. 
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However, regional aid has given rise to a situation in which Member 
States try to outdo each other, and this has jeopardized the balance that 
is being sought. In coordinating regional aid granted in the central regions1 
the commission found in 1971 a means of eliminating the unfavourable effects 
of regional aid. 
4. The first report on competition policy2 outlined the principles of 
coordination applicable from 1 January 1972 to regional aid granted by the 
Member States in the central regions of the Community. It stated that 
coordination would be gradual. The year 1972 was therefore a transitional 
year used to carry out the technical work needed for full implementation of 
the coordination principles. 
The precise nature of this work is described in the second report on 
competition policy, 3 which we are now discussing. The results of this work 
are described in the Communication from the Cornmission of the European 
Communities on the implementation of Principles of Coordination of Regional 
Aid in 1972,4 which we must therefore examine together with the abovementioned 
document. 
The Commission's communication represents the first report that it is 
required to submit annually to the Council and to the other Community 
authorities on the implementation of the principles of coordination of 
regional aid. 
5. This report and the section entitled 'Aid schemes for regional purposes' 
of the report on competition discuss the work done in 1972. This covered: 
(a) Internal administrative measures adopted by the Member States to ensure 
compliance with the coordination principles and the forwarding of 
information to the responsible authorities, 
(b) Establishment of a method of supervising the application of the co~ 
ordination principles. This supervision is carried out by the commission 
on the basis of a posteriori notification of significant cases applying 
1 
(assisted investments of 4m u.a. and above if new jobs are created and 
of 3m u.a. and above if new jobs are not created). The details of the 
notification of such cases, their frequency and the information to be 
provided have also been establishedr 
- General regional aid schemes (communication from the Commission to the 
council), OJ No. c 111, 4.11.71, p.71 
- First resolution of 20 October 1971 by the representatives of the 
governments of the Member States meeting in Council on general regional 
aid schemes, OJ No. C lll, 4.11.71, p.l 
2 Doc. 31/72 - No. 143 to 153 
3 Doc. 148/73 - No. 83 to 88 
4 Doc. 122/73 
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(c) Technical work designed to make certain types of aid easier to inves-
tigate. Work is continuing in this field. It has in particular been 
decided to fix for certain types of aid (particularly tax concessions) 
a standard ceiling in subsidy equivalents which cannot be exceeded. 
Progress has also been made in respect of other types of aid such as 
aid for land acquisition and for construction. Work is continuing on 
state guarantees: 
(e) Technical work concerning assessm~nt of the impact of regional aid 
on the different sectors of the economy. The aim here was to establish 
a method of analysis which allows an assessment of the impact of aid 
on the various sectors. The method adopted reveals which industries 
or branches of industry benefit most from regional aid and, among 
these, which involve the greatest hazards from the point of view of 
Community trade and competition. This method also makes it possible 
to determine the Member State or States in which problems might exist 
in these industries or branches of industry and the causes of the 
situations thus diagnosed. None of this technical work requires 
particular comment. 
6. Paragraph 88 of the Report on Competition points out that the 
coordination principles will apply to the new Member States from 1 July 1973 
at the latest. The first six months of the year were allowed for adjustment 
of the Communicatiop to the Council and the first resolution on regional 
aids, adopted by the Member States meeting within the Council, to take 
account of enlargement. 
The last sub-paragraph of paragraph 88 etates that this work had been 
'made more difficult than expected by the fact that in two States, Denmark 
and the United Kingdom, new aid schemes were brought in during the period.' 
In fact, the new Member States ought to have taken account of the 
resolution of 20 October 1971 when introducing~ aid schemes. This 
resolution imposes a ceiling on aid granted in the central regions, stipulates 
that aid must be easy to investigate and refers to the regional $pec±f±l;:±ty 
of such aid. 
The extension of the coordination principles to the new Member States 
is essential. Regions of the new Member States which are in direct competition 
with other Member States must not be declared peripheral without Community 
control since this would allow them to receive limitless amounts of regional 
aid, and attempts to attract new investors would seriously distort competition. 
Moreover, enlargement should lead to certain regions losing their peripheral 
character within the Community. 
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It was therefore necessary to find a balanced solution which took account 
of the constraints to which the Six were subject and which would apply to the 
acceding countries. 
The Commission consequently took a decision in June 1973, pursuant to 
Article 154 of the Treaty of Accession, on the coordination of regional aid 
schemes in the new Member States. 1 
The Commission thus decided on the demarcation of the cent:cal regions of 
the three new Member States to which the coordination principles would apply 
from 1 July 1973 onwards. 
In addition, the Commission will be laying dO'tm, by 31 December 1974, 
rules governing coordination in all regions of the enlarged Couununity, i.e. 
cent:cal and other regions. These rules may make provision for various types 
of region in which different ceilings of aid concentration will apply. They 
must also consider the specific problems facing each of the peripheral regions. 
The Commission's attention should be drawn to the need to take account of 
decisions taken in the meantime on Community regional policy, when coordinating 
regional aid. 
·--·---- -·-· 7. Pursuant to Articles 92 et seq. of the EEC Treaty and the abovementioned 
coordination principles, the Commission expressed its views in 1972 on aid 
s~hemes instituted in Germany, Belgium, France and Italy. These schemes 
concerned: 
- investment bonuses in the German coal areas, 
- the Belgian economic growth law, 
- the new French regional bonus scheme, 
- assistance to industrial undertakings in the autonomous region of 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia. 
In each case the Commission made sure that planned aid was specifically 
regional in nature. 
In all cases the commission is rightly opposed to aid which does not have 
necessary structural or regional adjustments as its basic objective. It is 
also justifiably in favour of aid being granted where problems are most serious. 
8. With regard to aid schemes for individual industries, the Commission has 
introduced Community rules which must be observed when aid is granted. 
These rules concern two branches of the transport industry: shipbuilding 
and aircraft production. In various Member States both branches are char-
acterized by their failure to adapt at national level to the necessities of 
competitiveness at world level, the result being a considerable drain on pub-
lic resources. 
1 communication from the Commission to the Council on 'general regional aid 
schemes'of 27 June 1973 - COM(73) 1110. 
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Two major agreements have been established in the ship-building sector: 
a directive adopted on 20 July 1972 by the Council of the European Communitiesl 
concerning shipbuilding aids and a general arrangement adopted by the OECD 
Council on 20 October 1972 with regard to the gradual elimination of obstacles 
to the achievement of normal conditions of competition with respect to ship-
building. 
In the field of aircraft production the Commission has submitted to the 
Council a memorandum on the 'industrial and technology policy measures to 
be adopted in the aircraft production industry'. On this occasion, the 
Commission proposed a 'framework arrangement' for aids. 
In view of the special features of undertakings in the transport sector 
and the fact that the definition of the competition rules applicable to it 
forms part of the common transport policy, the Council decided that Regulation 
No. 17/622 implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty should not apply to 
this sector. 
Special methods of implementation are described in Regulation No. 1017/ 
68 of l0 July 19683, which provides for the non-applicability of the proh-
ibt~ion of agreements having as their sole object the joint application of 
technical improvements or technical cooperation and the grouping of small and 
medium-sized undertakings with the object of financing or jointly acquiring 
materials and transport supplies directly related to their activities. 
Regulation No. 1017/68 also introduces an exception tothe principle of 
prior notification stipulated by Regulation No. 17. 
To date, the Commission has not had to institute pro~eedings to put a 
stop to infringements. 
The relevant departmants of the Commission have examined the operations 
of five Rhine navigation pools and conventions: the Duisburg Freight Convention, 
the French Rhine Traffic Convention, the Kettwig Pool, the Rhine Container-
Linie and the Rhine Grain Shipping conventim. The question was whether these 
pools and conventions allowed effective competition on the transport markets 
in question. At the present stage of its investigations the Commission has 
not decided to institute proceedings with a view to the termination of infri-
n9e™.3nts arising from the Rhine pools and conventions. 
l OJ No. L 169 of 27.7.1972 
2 OJ No. 13 of 21.2.1962, p. 204 
3 OJ No. L 175 of 23.7.1968, p. 
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Opinion of the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment 
Draftsman : Lord O'Hagan 
On 9 October 1973 the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment 
appointed Lord O'HAGAN draftsman. It considered the Opinion at its meeting 
of 24 October 1973 and adopted it unanimously. 
The following were present: Mr Betrand, chairman; Mr Adams, vice-
chairman, Mr Durand, vice-chairman; Lord O'Hagan, draftsman of the opinion; 
Mr Yeats, Mr Vernaschi, Mr Pisoni, Mr Harzschel, Mr van der Gun, Mr Bermani, 
Mr Vermeylen, Miss Lulling and Mrs Nielsen (deputuzing for Mr Christensen). 
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SECOND REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 
(Doc. 148/73} 
Introduction 
1. In every Member State large companies are gaining an ever 
stronger position. For example, in the United Kingdom, the share of the 100 
largest industrial undertakings in total turnover rose from 26 % in 1953 to 
50 % in 1970. In the Federal Republic of Germany the share.rose fran 34 % in 
1954 to 50 % in 1964. Naturally, such concentration has an important. impact 
on international as well as national markets, and can become a serious danger 
to the steady development of genuine free competition. 
2. For the EEC itself, such agglomerations pose an important chal-
lenge, not only in that the task of maintaining free competition may grow more 
complicated, but also because-the new enlarged Conununity proclaims that it 
attaches equal importance to social and economic policies. Thus the social 
aspects of competition policy can, in all modesty, be seen as suitable grounds 
on which to judge the outcome of the intentions of those Heads of State or 
Government who signed the Paris Com.~uniqu6 of 31 October 1972. 
3. Those who signed in favour of free competition did so in the 
knowledge that a sufficient supply of products at reasonable prices can be 
ensured, only if there is adequate and genuine competition between suppliers. 
Without such competition, the consumer will pay unfairly high prices. 
4. It Etherefore not emotional or naive for the Social Affairs 
and Employment Conunittee to express anxiety about the concentration of econo-
mic power within Member States or the increasing strength of multinational 
corporations; such organisations have an inunense influence on the choice and 
price of goods available to the a:nsumer. 
5. Multinational companies especially deserve this Conunittee's 
attention. Some of those companies have annual budgets bigger than those of 
' most of our Member States. others appear to be accountable to tlobody, and 
pass money across the exchanges in a way that contributes to monetary insta-
bility, which in turn has repercussions on economic and social policy. Such 
manoeuvres can easily be carried out with no reference to national or Conununi-
ty social policy r ·in reality the laying off of labour in one country because 
it is cheaper in another, can produce very unpleasant social consequences. 
6. The Conunittee on Social Affairs and Employment believes that 
the social implications of such activities call for Conununity attention. 
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The Heads of State or Government, in the Final Conununiqu~, instructed the 
Institutions to seek out ways and means of 'strengthening and coordinating 
consumer protection'. It is in that spirit the Committee has examined the 
Second Report on Competition Policy. 
Specific Conunents 
7. Competition is already one of the few sectors in which the 
Conunission can act independently of the Council of Ministers, and, particular-
ly since 1970, the Commission has pursued an active competition policy. In 
1971 came the Conunission's first recourse to Article 86, when the German Com-
pany GEMA was forced to modify certain monopolistic practices in connection 
with musical performance rights in Germany. In December 1971 the Commission 
ordered Continental Can, the huge American company, to divest itself of a 
newly acquired Dutch firm 1 although the European Court squashed the Co~.rnis-
sion's order on the grounds that the Commission had not proved the case on 
the facts, it was important that the Court expressly upheld the Commission's 
interpretation of Article 86. 
The Conunission is currently investigating the activities of 
Hoffman La Roche, the multinational drugs firm in conflict with the British 
Government. 
So it is clear that the Commission has already established a 
good track-record, in spite of the small size of its staff. 
8. At present, the Conunission is hoping for additional powers to 
regulate those mergers not dealt with in Article 85 or 86 of the EEC Treaty. 
A draft regulation has already been published, and the Commission hopes it 
would become effective on 1 January 1975. 
The Commission's own figure for the Six show how necessary the 
regulation really is. In comparison with 1962-66, the rate of increase per 
year in the number of mergers doubled during 1966-70. It was also found in 
studies of a wide range of sectors that, in every case, the four largest 
undertakings had increased their share of total turnover. 
9. It is against this background that the draft regulation calls 
for mergers of concerns whose total annual turnover exceeds 1,000 million u.a. 
to be notified three months in advance. The same conditions can also apply 
as a preventative measure even if the total turnover does not exceed 200 
million u.a. and the market share is not greater than 25 %. 
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10. Naturally it would be impossible to reproduce the whole direc-
tive in this report, and of course it will be subject to many modifications. 
At the moment,.business interests are particularly concerned about the delays 
likely to be caused by the Commission's deliberations. 
It is perhaps worth noting that, as a result of the accession 
of the three new Member States, the area of validity of Community competition 
law extends to other farmer EFTA countries since, in their trade agreements, 
those countries pledged themselves to the safeguarding of free competition. 
11. Thus the Committee on Social Affairs and Employment studied 
the Second Report on Competition Policy in the knowledge that the Commission 
is hoping for new powers to regulate mergers. Before the Council agreed to 
such proposals, the Commission will continue to take action, where appropriate, 
against mergers and the abuse of dominant positions, under Article 85 and 86 
of the EEC Treaty. 
However, Europe's economic health calls for stronger controls 
over mergers, particularly where multinational companies are involved. The 
consumers of the Community can only benefit if the Commission is better equip-
ped to ensure genuine free competition. 
Conclusions 
The Committee on Social Affairs and Employment 
1. feels that it should concentrate on the social points of the Commission's 
Second Report on Competition Policy 
2. notes with disappointment, while admiring and endorsing the activity of 
the Commission as chronicled on pages 15-161, that pages 163-170, which 
are devoted to consumer protection, compare somewhat feebly to the much 
larger earlier sections of the Report, nor does it see where the content 
of these few pages give any compensation for their lack of length; 
3. considers the Commission's activities on behalf of the consumer, as 
listed on pages 170-171, ns very inadequate; feels that the Commission 
will 'not hoi\Ql.ir,. the aims of the Paris Communiqul! which called for 
'strengthening and coordinating consumer protection', unless the number 
of personnel employed in this area is greatly increased J 
4. demands further information from the Commission concerning its contacts 
with national and Community consumer groups; 
5. recognises that links with such bodies are important 
welcomes the foundation of a directorate for consumer protection 
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requests full cooperation between the Directorate-General for competi-
tion policy and the directorate for consumer protection i 
6. insists on detailed information concerning the way in which the Com-
mission intends tackling the problem of public corporations 
7. asks that the Conunission examine the question of fixing the size of 
mergers, which should be registered to 1000 million u.a., when even 
smaller multinational companies may well play disruptive roles in the 
social and economic life of Member States i 
B. hopes that despite its lack of staff the Conunission will be able to 
achieve its objeetives-of monitoring free competition and of studying 
market trends. 
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